Homicides have increased significantly in Mexico since 2008 with approximately 50,000 deaths related to drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) between 2007 and 2011. The negative consequences have been myriad including rising insecurity, deterred economic growth and reduced labour force participation. One of the main explanations put forward in the previous literature is the crackdown on DTOs initiated by President Felipe Calderón in December 2006. A key aspect of this enforcement strategy has been the deployment of thousands of military and federal police forces to debilitate DTOs including through the arrest and killing of their leaders. As a consequence, major DTOs have fragmented and turf wars for leadership and control of strategic territories have spurred.

In this paper, I examine whether turf wars among DTOs for the control of strategic territories increase during the lame duck period, when incumbent DTOs might be relatively weaker. Using homicides as a proxy for turf wars, my results show support for this hypothesis.